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ABSTRACT
This research analyzed the relationship of ownership structures with 
dividend policy using a sample of 43 plantation companies listed on Bursa 
Malaysia from 2013 to 2015. The results of the Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS)analysis find that foreign ownership has a positive and significant 
influence on dividend policy while state ownership has a negative and 
significant influence on dividend policy. Furthermore, it was also found 
that Government Linked Investment Companies (GLICs) ownership has 
an insignificant influence on dividend policy. This study provides evidence 
to policymakers of government through their GLICs and states in selecting 
and deciding their dividend policies. Furthermore, it also provides evidence 
to shareholders and managers that companies with foreign ownership pay 
higher dividends while companies with state ownership pay lower dividends. 
This study is among the early studies that contributes to the finance and 
corporate governance literature by examining the relationship between 
GLICs as whole and foreign ownerships with a dividend policy in Malaysia.
Keywords: Dividend Policy, GLICs Ownership, State Ownership, Foreign 
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INTRODUCTION
Dividend policy is the process of a board of directors or management 
decisions regarding the distribution of a company’s net income to the 
dividends or retained earnings. A company would distribute a part or all 
of its net income to  shareholders for their investments in a company as 
dividends would retain a part or all of its net income in the balance sheet of 
a company as retained earnings for reinvestment purposes (Albouy, 1990).
Thus, the decision of distribution of net income would affect the objective 
of a company’s financial management in maximizing shareholders value. 
Black (1976)discusses the reasons why investors need to generate a return on 
their investment in a company and suggests that a company pays dividends 
to reward their existing shareholders and attract new shareholders to invest 
in its common stock at a higher price because they can value the dividends.
Damodaran (2011) classifies dividends paid into four ways. First, 
dividends could be paid in additional cash or stock. Second, stock dividends 
paid out to the investors raise a company’s outstanding shares and reduces 
its stock price per share. Third, regular dividends are paid out to investors 
at regular intervals in either quarterly, semiannually, or annually. Last, a 
liquidate dividend that will be viewed by the internal revenue service, is 
a company paid out dividend that exceeds its recorded retained earnings. 
Damodaran (2011) states that a dividend policy could be measured by either 
the dividend yield ratio or a dividend payout ratio. The dividend policy 
is a concerning issue to investors because it is a more important source 
of income while investors are likely to monitor the performance of their 
companies through a dividend policy. Since a dividend policy has a major 
influence on the companies’ share price, asset pricing, capital structure, 
capital budgeting, and mergers and acquisitions, policymakers often face 
a heavy task to set up a proper dividend policy (Allen & Michaely, 1995).
Miller and Modigliani (1958) provide evidence based on dividend 
irrelevance theories that the valuation of a company is not effected by 
its dividend policy in perfect capital markets. The reason behind this is 
that investors who participate in perfect capital markets are indifferent to 
receive their returns as dividends or as capital gains because both forms of 
returns have no further implications for the investors. According to the Bird 
in the Hand theory developed by Lintner (1962), investors can enhance a 
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preference for dividends to counter the imperfections of markets such as 
limited certainty and asymmetry information. Michaely and Roberts (2006) 
claim that changes of the level of dividends and smoothening them over time 
would reduce the volatility of a company’s stock price reaction in response 
to dividend announcements. Rozeff (1982) argues that the optimal level of 
dividends is a tradeoff among higher dividends which would raise agency 
costs and transaction costs associated with outside financing.
The Agency Theory indicates that a high dividend payout assists in 
reducing funds available for consumption by the agents of a company. 
Shareholders will put pressure over the agent to give out the excess income 
or liquidity from the year as a dividend, which in turn forces the agents 
to seek for more funds from equity markets or debt markets if investment 
opportunities arise. Therefore, agency costs will be eliminated (Easterbrook, 
1984; Rozeff, 1982). Particularly, large shareholders and institutional 
investors choose to avoid engaging in costly monitoring activities by 
demanding higher dividends (Haye, 2014). DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz 
(2006) argue that the optimal level of a dividends payout policy is identified 
in order to distribute companies’ free cash flow. Furthermore, they also 
discuss, due to the existence of the life cycle theory that companies pay 
lower dividends in their initial years. Their excess investment opportunities 
as compared to their internal funds are revealed as a reason of this behavior. 
Issa (2015) argues that most investors intuitively relate the profitability 
of a company to a better dividend policy in several countries including 
Malaysia. However, the pattern of dividend policy varies from country to 
country, particularly between developed and developing countries emerging 
markets. It is reported that dividends pay out are more volatile in developing 
countries emerging markets than in developed countries (Glen, Karmokolias, 
Miller, & Shah, 1995). A conceptual model has been developed in such 
a way to provide an easy understanding of the significant variables that 
drive a dividend policy (Issa, 2015). However, Ahmed and Murtaza (2015), 
Bhattacharyya, Mawani, and Morrill (2008), Black (1996),Issa (2015), 
Mahdzan, Zainudin, and Shahri, (2016), and Subramaniam and Devi 
(2011) argue that a dividend policy is one of the major issues that remains 
unsolved in the world of finance. Allen and Michaely (2003) argue that 
further research should consider the significant variables that determinea 
dividend policy.
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Malaysia is a developing country, yet its capital markets, which 
contain conventional and Islamic capital markets, is more developed than 
many other emerging markets (Ismail, 2016). To achieve a greater and 
fairer economic environment, the Malaysiangovernment has implemented 
some strategies. Among them, the implementation of the Capital Market 
Master Plan from 2000 to 2010 that helped the capital market grow from a 
market size of RM717.5 billion (US$239 billion) in 2000 to RM2.0 trillion 
(US$667 billion) in 2010 (Security Malaysia, 2013). Therefore, the capital 
market in Malaysia grew by 11.1 percent per year between 2000 and 2010, 
ranking it as the fifth fastest growing market in Asia. Another government 
strategy in Malaysia is to increase the capital market from RM1.81 trillion 
(US$424 billion) to RM4.5 trillion (US$ 1.05 trillion) by 2020 to achieve 
the target to become a developed country (Suruhanjaya Sekuriti Malaysia, 
2011). Hence, dividend policy makers should come up with policies to 
attract investors to increase market capitalization.
As reported in the Malaysia Market Focus Investment Strategy in 
January 2015, following the sharp fall in oil prices, the government’s budget 
for the year 2015 was revised. In addition, several measures were introduced, 
namely the injection of an additional RM400 million (US$93.7 million) 
in the form of dividends from government linked companies (GLCs) and 
GLICs to boost revenues and rationalize costs accordingly. Moreover, the 
Malaysian Investment Development Authority in 2016 reported that the 
government in Malaysia has started to liberalize foreign participations to 
invest in several sectors. Furthermore, as a part of the government policy 
in Malaysia, state ownership aims to distribute a dividend income to the 
Bumiputra unitholders in order to encourage them to participate in the 
equity market (Chu, 2004).
Malaysia is among the highest dividends paying countries in Asia 
(Benjamin, Wasiuzzaman, Mokhtarinia, & Nejad, 2016; Yap, 2012). As 
stated by Markus Rosgen, chief Asia strategist at Citigroup Incorporation 
that based on a fundamental analysis, dividends work well in Asia, 
specifically in Malaysia due to the alignment of minority shareholders 
interest with the majority shareholders i.e., government owners (cited in 
Benjamin et al., 2016; Yap, 2012). In Asian countries including Malaysia, 
companies tend to be less scattered and more concentrated in terms of 
ownership structure. Therefore, the concentration of ownership is found to 
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be owned by the government or state, families or large corporations unlike 
in the West countries (Amran& Ahmad, 2013). 
Government ownership could be influenced either through the 
federal government or state government only in Malaysia. Federal 
government ownership is achieved through shareholdings in companies 
through GLICs1 (Abdullah, Abdullah, & Redzuan, 2014; Le & Buck, 
2009). The GLICs2ownership is defined as companies that have primary 
commercial objectives and in which the federal regime of Malaysia has a 
straight controlling stake to at least appoint board members.  While, state 
ownership is realized through state-owned companies. State ownership is 
different from government ownership and this type of ownership can be 
clearly distinguished from government ownership in Malaysia although 
it is impossible to differentiate these two ownerships in China (Le & 
Buck, 2009). The research on state ownership is limited in the Malaysian 
perceptive. State ownership here refers to the state-owned assets or control 
over any asset in the country at the state level. 
The relationship of various types of ownership structures with a 
dividend policy has been conducted in many countries including Malaysia 
(see for example, Abdullah et al., 2014; Al-Najjar & Kilincarsla, 2016; 
Al-Kuwari, 2009;Benjamin et al., 2016; Ben-Nasr, 2015; Ferreira, Massa, 
& Matos, 2010; Goyal, Jategonkar, Megginson, & Muckley, 2014; 
Gordon, 1963;Gul, 1999;Kumar, 2003; Lintner, 1962; Thanatawee, 2014; 
Mancinelli & Ozkan, 2006; Wang & Yung, 2011; Walter, 1963). Among 
them in Malayisa, Abdullah et al. (2014), Benjamin et al. (2016) and Ismail 
(2016) conducted their studies on the effect of government ownership as 
“a percentage owned by state and sevenGLICs2 asindividual”, family 
ownership, and largest shareholder ownership, respectively, on dividend 
policy. Furthermore, it has been recommended by Ismail (2016) that future 
research can investigatethe the relationship between other various types of 
ownership structures such as state ownership, board ownership, and financial 
institutions with a dividend policy in Malaysia. 
1 The individual GLICs name in Malaysian language and their literal English translation: Permodalan 
Nasional Berhad or National Capitalisation Limited, Khazanah Nasional Berhad or National 
Treasure Limited, Kumpulan Wang Amanah Pencen or Pension Trust Money Group, Kementerian 
Kewangan Diperbadankan or Ministry of Finance Incorporation, Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja 
or Employees Provident Fund, Lembaga Tabung Haji or Pilgrimage Fund,  and Lembaga Tabung 
Angkatan Tentera or Armed Forces Fund Board.
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Therefore, this current study extends the studies conducted by 
Abdullah et al. (2014),Benjamin et al. (2016) and Ismail (2016). Hence, this 
study contributes to the area of finance and corporate governance literature 
at investigating the relationship between GLICs2 as whole, state, and foreign 
ownerships with a dividend policy in Malaysia. Furthermore, this is among 
the early studies in Malaysia  that  carries out robust analyses by examining 
the GLICs, state, and foreign ownerships using dummy variables, which is 
equal to one if GLICs, state, and foreign owned and zero if otherwise, with 
a dividend policy. Moreover, this is among the early studies in Malaysia 
that undertook a robust analyses by examining the nonlinearity effect of 
GLICs, state, and foreign ownerships on dividend policy. 
LITERATURE REVIEWS AND HYPOTHESES
Governments often invest in corporations to give access to extra fund 
support, to further an enterprise’s advancement, and to advance corporate 
mechanisms by enhancing the monitoring of the corporations (Lau &Tong, 
2008; Wade, 2004). Boubakri, Cosset and Guedhami (2009) argue that 
companies with government ownership can work in the market to develop 
the fair value of trading practices in the absence of powerful regulators, 
which may secure market members towards the misuse of market power. 
Gul (1999) argues that companies with a low or non-government ownership 
probably encounter trouble raising assets, while it probably depends on 
retained profit for their reinvestment purposes, which may reduce profit 
payout. He also found that government ownership has a positive and 
significant effect on a dividend policy. Al-Kuwari (2009) conducted a 
research to determine the dividend policies of companies listed on the 
Gulf co-operation council and shows that government ownership is 
positively related to dividend policies, indicating that companies with 
government ownership pay higher dividends. Al-Kuwari (2009) and Gul 
(1999) claim that the explanation behind the positive relationship is that 
government ownership itself would attract external assets or funds more 
easily. Thanatawee (2014) conducted a study in China utilizing a sample 
of firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and found that firms 
with higher government ownership have a positive influence on dividend 
payout. Nnadi, Wogboroma, and Kabel (2013) analyzed the determinants of 
dividend policy in Africa using a data of 29 listed firms from 1998 to 2009 
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and found that either a government’s or its agencies ownership in a firm 
has a positive influence on its dividend policy. They also concluded that 
government owned firms pay high dividends in Africa, which is consistent 
with the view of agency costs, where the government is considered as the 
agent for their citizens.
Thomsen (2004) examined dividends payout as a moderating variable 
among blockholders ownership and the market stock value of European 
countries and indicated that a negative and significant blockholders level 
impact for government ownership and banks while the evidence for family 
ownership and institutional investors were mixed. Ben-Nasr (2015) found 
that government ownership is negatively related to dividend policy of 
multinational new privatized companies in 43 different countries. This result 
is in line with the prediction of agency costs. He also argued that the level 
of corporate governance practices in the countries affected the relationship 
of government ownership with dividend policy. He additionally indicated 
that the adverse relationship of government ownership with a dividend 
policy is more articulated in those countries that have weak order and law 
and also have a lower level of balances and checks. 
Warrad, Abed, Khriasat, and Al-Sheikh (2012) analyzed the impact of 
ownership structures on dividends policy as measured by Tobin’s Q utilizing 
a sample of all Jordanian industrial companies and found an insignificant 
impact of government ownership on dividends policy. Riaz, Liu, and Ahmad 
(2016) obtained a sample of all Pakistani companies   to investigate the 
effect of corporate governance on dividends policy from 2009 to 2015. 
They found an insignificant relationship betweem government ownership 
and dividend policy, which is in agreement with Aguenaou and Di (2013), 
who analysed the firms listed on the Casablanca Stock Exchange over the 
period 2004 to 2010.
Abdullah et al. (2014) conducted a study in Malaysia to examine 
the effects of seven GLICsas individuals on the dividend policy using a 
sample of listed companies. They found that the effects of seven GLICs 
as individuals were not significant on dividend per share as a measure of 
the dividend policy, indicating that the seven GLICs as individuals did not 
effect or demand for dividend payments from companies. In comparison this 
current study is on the relationship between government ownership through 
GLICs as whole and the dividend policy. Basically, it is hypothesized that:
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H1: GLICs ownership has a significant relationship with the dividend 
policy of listed plantation companies in Malaysia.
Lakonishok and Lev (1987) state that dividend distribution restricts the 
ability of a company to pay out dividends in the future which implies that 
dividend is less likely to be used by state shareholders as such dividend limits 
their ability to get cash from listed companies in the future. Furthermore, 
they also state that dividend distribution increases the share’s liquidity and 
its attractiveness to investors. Gursoy and Aydogan (1999) and Yurtoglu 
(2003) claim that ownership structures are categorized by high family 
ownership concentration with other large owners such as foreigners and 
state owned. Wei, Zhang, and Xiao (2004) argue that companies with the 
level of state shareholders ownership share would probably pay out cash 
dividends and these shareholders would probably surrender the exercise of 
stock subscription rights. Su, Fung, Huang, and Shen (2014) investigated 
the relationship between state ownership and dividends policy in China and 
found that firms with state ownership shares pay higher dividends than firms 
with non-state ownership shares. They also concluded that firms with state 
ownership can easily get such a loan from its related owned banks in China 
as compared to firms with non-state ownership. Setiawan, Bandi, Phua, 
and Trinugroho (2016) also conducted a research in China and Indonesia. 
They found a positive effect of state ownership on dividend policy of the 
company. They concluded that particularly in China, firms with a higher 
state ownership distributed more cash dividends to the major shareholders 
(Lam, Sami, & Zhou, 2012).
Kouki and Guizani (2009) tested the relationship of state ownership 
share with dividends policy as measured by dividend per share using a 
sample of Tunisian corporations and found a negative relationship of state 
ownership with dividends policy. Al-Najjar and Kilincarslan (2016) used a 
sample of 264 firms listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange to examine the 
influence of state ownership on dividend policy from 2003 to 2012. They 
showed a negative effect of state ownership on dividends policy during the 
period. Al-Shubiri, Taleb, and Al-Zoed (2012) tested the relationship of 
state ownership share with dividends policy in Jordan and found that state 
ownership negatively influences dividend policy. They also indicated that 
although state ownership is negatively associated with dividends policy, 
state owned companies still pay more cash dividends than privately owned 
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companies. On the other hand, Abdullah et al. (2014) found that the effect 
of state ownership is not significant on dividend per share as a measure 
of dividends policy, indicating that the state does not effect or demand for 
dividend payment from companies. Therefore, it is hypothesized that:
H2: State ownership has a significant relationship with dividends policy 
in listed plantation companies in Malaysia.
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) claimed that 
firms with foreign ownership shares have better governance mechanisms 
that leads them to pay higher dividends and such firms have more incentives 
to monitor their corporate activities to protect their investments. Lam, 
Sami, and Zhou (2012) argued that foreign shareholders keep dividends 
inside their firms to refund investments. As per the view of the agency 
hypothesis, foreign shareholders are far from the firms to control managers’ 
activities hence, they authorize these managers to pay dividends in order 
to decrease the free cash flows available with the manager and thus control 
their behavior. This is consistent with a Pakistani research that focussed 
on a sample of 17 companies listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange, which 
found that higher foreign investors in a company led to a higher dividends 
policy in a company (Ullah, Fida, & Khan, 2012). Setiawan et al. (2016) 
tested the relationship of foreign ownership with dividend policies using 
a sample of Indonesian listed companies from 2006 to 2012 and found a 
positive relationship between foreign ownership with dividend policies. 
This finding is in agreement with the finding of Bokpin (2011), Setiawan 
et al. (2016) and Warrad, Abed, Khriasat, and Al-Sheikh (2012). Setiawan 
et al. (2016) who also concluded that foreign owned firms distributed more 
dividends than other types of ownerships as the firms try to maintain their 
reputation in host countries.
Aydin and Cavdar (2015)tested the relationship between foreign 
ownership and dividend policy among 19 listed companies of the Bursa 
Istanbul corporate governance index who practised a specific level of 
the principles of corporate governance from 2007 to 2014.They showed 
that higher foreign ownership in a company brings a higher dividend 
payment. Meanwhile, Kowerski and Wypych (2016) found that foreign 
ownership is positively associated with corporate dividend policy. They 
also explained that a higher corporate dividend payment is due to the fact 
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that a dividend is regarded to foreign strategic investors as an attractive 
source of income. Their result is also in line with the result of Balagobei 
and Thiruchchenthurnathan (2016), who utilized a sample of Sri Lankan 
listed plantation companies. They also argued that due to the fact that foreign 
investors desire dividend distributions rather than retaining the dividends 
or higher capital gains.
However, Al-Najjar and Kilincarslan (2016) used data from 264 
Istanbul Stock Exchange listed non-financial and non-utility firms over 
a 10-year period from 2003 to 2012. They found that foreign ownership 
negatively affects dividends policy. This result is consistent with Sakinc and 
Gungor (2015), who used a sample of 271 companies listed on the Istanbul 
Stock Exchange from 2004 to 2011 and indicated that increased foreign 
ownership shares in a company leads to decreased dividends payment in 
Turkey. Al-Najjar and Kilincarslan (2016) also suggested that since foreign 
investors have tax benefits on their income from dividends, they invested 
more in companies with a long run growth potential, rather than the short 
run dividends income. However, Sakinc and Gungor (2015) concluded 
that foreign owned firms may not distribute profits to their shareholders or 
distribute only low amounts and use retained earnings for investment. On 
the other hand, Aguenaou and Di (2013) found that foreign ownership does 
not effect dividend policy. Thus, it is hypothesized that:
H3: Foreign ownership has a significant relationship with dividends policy 
in listed plantation companies in Malaysia.
METHODOLOGY
The population of this study consisted of all plantation companies listed on 
Bursa Malaysia which sums up to 43 companies. The plantation companies 
were used in this research because Malaysia’s plantation sector is a major 
contributor to the value of the nation’s economy as it does not incur too much 
of imports compared to other sectors such as the construction, electronics and 
electrical sectors (Ooi, 2017). Furthermore, Malaysia is one of the world’s 
largest palm oil exporters which supplies 32.7 percent of world palm oil 
exports (Workman, 2017). Thus, Malaysia’s plantation sector is preferred 
among investors. Even the GLICs have recently announced an increase in 
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their investments in the plantation sector in order to enhance their portfolio 
as they believe that the plantation sector will provide sustainable income 
(Adilla, 2017; Rosli, 2017).
Since the focus was on plantation companies, 43 companies were used 
as a sample in the current research which follows the study of Balagobei and 
Thiruchchenthurnathan, (2016) on Sri Lankan listed plantation companies. 
The 43 companies’ data covered a period of 3 years (2013-2015) used for 
this study, resulted in a total of 129 company-year observations. The year 
2013 up to 2015 was selected because it covers the issuance time of the 
Malaysian code of corporate governance, 2012. The variables included 
three ownership variables namely, GLICs2 as whole, state, and foreign 
ownerships were used as independent variables while one measure of the 
dividend policy that is the dividend payout ratio was used as the dependent 
variable. In order to control the relationship between ownership variables 
and dividend policy, three control variables namely firm size, debt ratio and 
profitability were used as these are more closely related to shareholders 
ownerships and have been shown in previous research to be significant 
in effecting dividend policy. The secondary data used in this study were 
obtained from the plantation companies’ annual reports for 3 years from 
2013 to 2015, downloaded from the Bursa Malaysia official website. Table 
1 shows the measurements of variables:
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Table 1: Measurement of Variables
Variables Measurements References 
Dependent variable
DPi,t One measure of dividend policy was used:
Dividend payout ratio was measured by 
dividends payout/net income in firm i in 
year t.
Ali Khan and Ahmad 
(2017).
Independent variables
GLICsi,t Total share held by seven GLICs2 as whole 
divided by total shares outstanding in firm 
i in year t.
Musallam and Muniandy 
(2017). 
SOi,t Share held by state divided by total shares 
outstanding in firm i in year t.
Musallam and Muniandy 
(2017).
FOi,t Share held by foreign divided by total shares 
outstanding in firm i in year t.
Taufil-Mohd, Md-Rus 
and Musallam (2013).
PROFi,t One measure of profitability was used:
Return on Assets of a firm i in year t. It was 
measured by the ratio of earnings before 
interest and taxes divided by total assets
Taufil-Mohd, Md-Rus 
and Musallam (2013).
FSIZEi,t Firm size of a firm i in year t. It was measured 
by the natural logarithm of total assets.
Taufil-Mohd, Md-Rus 
and Musallam (2013).
DEBTi,t Debt ratio of a firm i in year t. It was 
measured by long term debt divided by 
total assets
Taufil-Mohd, Md-Rus 
and Musallam (2013).
This study used the panel data technique which was estimated using 
the OLS method in order to estimate the relationship of GLICs, state, and 
foreign ownerships with dividend policy. Therefore, the following regression 
model was utilized:
 DPi,t = B0 + B1 GLICsi,t + B2 SOi,t + B3 FOi,t + B4 PROFi,t + B5 FSIZEi,t 
+ B6 DEBTi,t + ei,t
Where: The variables are described in Table 1.
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
The descriptive statistics results of this research are summarized in Table 2. 
It illustrates that the average value for dividend policy in the listed plantation 
companies is 0.691, which is larger than the average estimation of 0.079 
detailed for a sample of Malaysian companies by Abdullah et al. (2014), 
while it is lower than the average value of 15.13 detailed for a sample of 
Japanese listed companies over the period of 1995to 2007 by Harada and 
Nguyen (2011). However, the range is from -1.932 percent to 8.317 percent 
with a standard deviation of 1.302 percent.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Variables [Total 129 Observations]
Variables Minimum Median Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
DP -1.932 0.458 8.317 0.691 1.302
GLICs 0.000 0.000 0.816 0.059 0.138
SO 0.000 0.000 0.646 0.047 0.125
FO 0.000 0.027 0.548 0.063 0.099
PROF -0.177 0.046 0.912 0.059 0.106
FSIZE 7.611 8.788 10.071 8.810 0.552
DEBT 0.000 0.030 0.440 0.083 0.117
Table 2 also shows that the largest average value of ownership 
variables in the listed plantation companies is 0.063 reported for foreign 
ownership with minimum (maximum) value of 0.000 percent (0.548 percent) 
and a standard deviation value of 0.099 percent. However, the lowest 
average value of ownership variables is 0.047 reported for state ownership 
with a minimum (maximum) value of 0.000 percent (0.646 percent) and 
a standard deviation value of 0.125 percent. Table 3 presents the results 
of Pearson’s correlation matrix of all independent variables used in this 
research. It shows that the relationships between all independent variables 
do not reveal a multicollinearity issue (Judge, Hill, Griffiths, Lutkepohl, 
& Lee, 1988).The highest correlation value is 0.466 reported for firm size 
and GLICs while the lowest correlation value is -0.142 reported for state 
ownership and foreign ownership.
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix between Independent Variables 
[Total 129 Observations]
Variables GLICs SO FO FZIZE DEBT PROF
GLICs 1.000 0.013 -0.086 0.466 0.350 0.055
SO 1.000 -0.142 -0.054 -0.005 0.043
FO 1.000 -0.017 0.051 0.020
FIZE 1.000 0.529 0.319
DEBT 1.000 0.230
PROF 1.000
The empirical results of Model (1) using the OLS estimation are 
summarized in Column 2 of Table 4. The result shows that foreign ownership 
positively effects dividend policy. This result is consistent with the proposed 
(H3) and statistically significant at 5%. It indicates that higher foreign 
ownership shares in a company leads to better governance mechanisms 
and pays higher dividends (La Porta, et al., 2000). This evidence supports 
the findings of Aydin and Cavdar (2015), Bokpin (2011), Balagobei and 
Thiruchchenthurnathan(2016), Kowerski and Wypych (2016), Setiawan 
et al. (2016) and Warrad et al. (2012), who found  that foreign ownership 
positively influences dividend policy and brings higher dividend payments. 
In contrast, this evidence does not support the findings of Al-Najjar and 
Kilincarslan (2016) and Sakinc and Gungor (2015), who found that higher 
foreign ownership negatively effects dividend policy and leads to lower 
dividend payments.
In contrast, the result points out that state ownership negatively and 
significantly influences dividend policy. The result has the coefficient 
consistent with the proposed (H2), which indicates that higher state 
ownership leads to lower dividend payments. This result is in line with Al-
Shubiri et al. (2012), Kouki and Guizani (2009) and Najjar and Kilincarslan 
(2016), who claimed that state ownership reduces the need to pay dividends 
to prompt the monitoring of capital markets. However, the finding is not in 
line with Bradford, Chen and Zhu (2013), Setiawan et al. (2016), and Su et 
al. (2014), who found that state ownership distributes more cash dividends 
to major shareholders.
However, insignificant effect is revealed between GLICs ownership 
with dividend policy, which is not in line with (H1), which means that 
GLICs does not influence dividend payments from companies. This result is 
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in agreement with Abdullah et al. (2014), who found that the seven GLICs 
as individuals are associated with dividend policy. They also indicated the 
reasons behind those results is because of the long-term goals of GLICs that 
are not seeking short-term income. Other reason is that GLICs also have 
other investments that would generate more or periodical incomes i.e., obtain 
fixed incomes from their investments in securities rather than depending on 
company dividends. The results point out that none of the control variables 
- firm size, profitability, and debt ratio are related to dividend policy.
Robustness Analyses
To investigate the influence of adjusted outliers on prior findings, a 
robustness analysis was done to adjust for outliers using a truncated method 
(Chen, Hong, & Stein, 2002). The findings of Model (2) after adjusting for 
outliers using the OLS estimation are shown in Column 3 of Table 4, which 
illustrates that the findings report similar results as in model (1) except 
for the influence of state ownership becomes insignificant on dividend 
policy while the influence of firm size becomes significant and positive on 
dividend policy.
As prior researchers have used different ways to estimate the ownership 
structure in several countries including Malaysia (i.e., Esa, & Zahari, 2016; 
Ghazali, 2010) further robustness analysis was also done, on the variables 
of GLICs, state, and foreign ownerships were used as dummy variables. 
The results of Model (3) testing GLICs, state, and foreign ownerships as 
dummy variables using the OLS estimation are summarized in Column 4 
of Table 4, which finds that the findings are similar as compared to those 
shown in model (1) of Table 4.
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Table 4: OLS Models by Using DP [Total 129 Observations]
Variables Model (1) [Percentage]
Model (2)
[After Removing 
Outliers]
Model (3) 
[Dummy]
Model (4) 
[Non-linearity]
const 7.148
(0.309)
-1.142
(0.111)
131.839
(0.195)
61.153
(0.160)
GLICs (D)(2) - - 28.688
(0.222)
-
GLICs(P)(1) -4.094
(0.628)
0.096
(0.270)
- 46.907
(0.079)*
GLICS(P2)(3) - - - -48.801
(0.097)*
SO (D)(2) - - -11.799
(0.207)
-
SO (P)(1) -2.839
(0.032)**
0.137
(0.475)
- -16.981
(0.406)
SO (P2)(3) - - - 30.004
(0.480)
FO (D)(2) - - 3.209
(0.057)*
-
FO (P)(1) 88.649
(0.018) **
1.449
(0.008)***
- 272.104
(0.234)
FO (P2) (3) - - - -441.855
(0.238)
PROF -31.393
(0.270)
-0.227
(0.726)
-44.770
(0.325)
-28.310
(0.256)
FSIZE -0.881
(0.316)
0.181
(0.015)**
-14.687
(0.182)
-7.779
(0.163)
DEBT 28.672
(0.201)
-0.263
(0.499)
10.736
(0.159)
19.766
(0.118)
R2 0.041 0.058 0.046 0.062
Adjusted R2 0.011 0.008 0.003 0.014
F-statistic 0.791 1.178 0.925 0.816
P-value(F) 0.578 0.322 0.479 0.602
Durbin-Watson Test
F-critical (dL )
1.993
(1.707)
2.024 2.092 2.073
White Test 30.372
(0.297)
- - -
Notes: * Significant at the 0.1 level; ** Significant at the 0.05 level; *** Significant at 0.01 level; (1) GLICs, state, and foreign 
ownership as the percentage of total equity holdings; (2) GLICs, state, and foreign ownership as a dummy variables; (3) The 
square of GLICs, state, and foreign ownership as the percentage of total equity holdings.
As prior researchers have also tested the nonlinearity effect of 
ownership structures (e.g., Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988; Stulz, 1988)
a robustness analysis was also done, on  the variables of GLICs ownership 
and the square of GLICs ownership, state ownership and the square of state 
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ownership, and foreign ownership and the square of foreign ownership. 
The results of Model (4) testing the nonlinearity effect of GLICs, state, 
and foreign ownerships on dividend policy using the OLS estimation are 
summarized in Column 5 of Table 4. The result points out that GLICs 
ownership has an inverted U-shaped function for dividend policy. The 
inverted U-shaped relationship implies that higher GLICs ownership 
leads to a better dividend policy up to a certain point and beyond that 
point, GLICs ownership lowers dividend policy. A possible reason for the 
inverted U-shaped relationship is that at low or intermediate level of GLICs 
ownership, other blockholders might own more shares, e.g., families and 
foreigners, and in this case, GLICs would just monitor these blockholders. 
However, when GLICs own a higher percentage of shares, there are no 
other blockholders. In contrast, the result points out that state ownership and 
foreign ownership have a linear relationship function for dividend policy. 
All other variables report similar results as shown in Model (1) of Table 4.
CONCLUSION
This study analyzed the influence of ownership structures on dividend policy 
amongst 43 plantation companies in Malaysia over the period 2013 to 2015. 
The results of the OLS method shows a positive significant association 
between foreign ownership and dividend policy while a negative significant 
dividend policy impact is revealed for state ownership. In contrast, GLICs 
ownership is not significantly associated with dividend policy.
The practical implication of this study is that it gives evidence to 
policymakers of governments through their GLICs and states in selecting 
and deciding their dividend policies. It also gives evidence to shareholders 
and managers that companies with foreign ownership pay higher dividends 
while companies with state ownership pay lower dividends. However, the 
theoretical implication is that, this is an early study of its kind in Malaysia 
that investigates the influence of GLICs2 as a whole and foreign ownerships 
on dividend policy. The results of this study give evidence that companies 
with foreign ownership have better corporate mechanisms and pay higher 
dividends, while state ownership has less corporate mechanisms and pay 
lower dividends.
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To examine the influence of ownership structures on dividend policy, 
this study focussed on seven GLICs as whole, state, and foreign ownerships 
only. However, other ownership variables such as family and non-family, 
domestic, board, financial institutions, and blockholders are encouraged for 
future research. Also, three control variables were used in this study, thus 
future research may use other variables such as firm age, sales growth and 
risk. This study also used a sample of plantation companies only. Therefore, 
other research may use other companies such as financial, industrial 
products, construction, consumer products, and property companies.
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